In the end, parliament blinked. With the release of the long-awaited report of the enquiry into Cabinet’s land grab, came a number of recommendations. Fifth on the list was a resolution “to appoint a sub-committee that will make a humble representation to the Head of State, calling for [the] dissolution of Cabinet” (HERE).
This is revealing. There is currently no constitutional authority for the lower house to send a delegation to the King to request such a dismissal. Instead, the 2005 Constitution authorizes parliament to pass a vote of no confidence. Unfortunately, it does so in contradictory terms. Sections 68(1)(e) and 68(4)(e) enable parliament to pass a vote of no confidence (by a 2/3 majority) in the PM or a minister respectively. Under s 68(5), a resolution of no confidence can be passed (by a 3/5 majority) in the entire Cabinet (about which I have written more, HERE.) So far, so good (except for the super-majority requirements – that is more than a 50%+ majority of parliamentarians – which makes it much more difficult to pass a vote compared with most other countries, which require the 50%+).
But then comes the contradiction. Section 134(5)(b) states that:
“where the House passes a resolution of no confidence in the Government of Swaziland and the Prime Minister does not within three days after that resolution resign, the King may dissolve Parliament or Cabinet” (my emphasis).
This contradicts the mandatory nature of s 68(5), which states that after a “resolution of no confidence…on the Cabinet” the King must sack the Cabinet. Perhaps these sections are not talking about the same thing. But in the corridors of parliament, the talk was that these sections were talking about the same resolution and that if such a resolution was passed, the PM would invariably refuse to resign, and parliament might be dismissed. Bearing in mind that the parliament has no say over the choice of Cabinet, it would then make no sense for the MPs to risk their jobs.
What is more troubling than the MPs timidity, and more worrying than the confusions contained within the 2005 Constitution, is that the new Constitution sets the parliament at loggerheads with the Monarch. The King appoints Cabinet and has the power to revoke the appointment either, according to the 2005 Constitution, on his own initiative or after a parliamentary vote (s 68). But in modern Swaziland, even parliament is not willing to publicly force the Monarch’s hand. Therefore, it is left for the King alone to clean out his closet, or cabinet as it were.
It would have been better to constitutionalize the current ‘practice’, authorizing parliament to send a delegation to the King (although this places the executive and the legislative in a potentially precarious – dare I say, Washingtonian – relationship). Either that, or make parliament wholly responsible for choosing Cabinet. No constitutional amendment would do more to secure the monarchy in Swaziland, or to lessen its power.
At any rate, parliament has a fair share of blame for its own impotence. Institutions increase their power by good and popular decisions. No one coming with fresh eyes to the US Constitution, for example, would think that the President holds all the aces. By abandoning the 2005 Constitution and being unwilling to risk their livelihoods, the MPs have sealed their own powerlessness.
At any rate, parliament has a fair share of blame for its own impotence. Institutions increase their power by good and popular decisions. No one coming with fresh eyes to the US Constitution, for example, would think that the President holds all the aces. By abandoning the 2005 Constitution and being unwilling to risk their livelihoods, the MPs have sealed their own powerlessness.
